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SHOULD THE PERCEPTION OF 
CORPORATE PUNISHMENT MATTER? 
Peter J. Henning* 
“Whoever conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but 
he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy.” 
Proverbs 28:13 
 
When corporations engage in criminal conduct, they generally 
do so in a big way. Save perhaps for Bernie Madoff’s massive 
Ponzi scheme, the types of harm inflicted by a corporation are far 
beyond what any individual could produce, both in terms of the 
dollars involved and the impact of the misconduct on broad 
portions of society. For example, as part of its guilty plea to 
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), German 
conglomerate Siemens A.G. admitted to paying approximately 
$1.4 billion in bribes, over a six-year period, through subsidiaries 
in France, Turkey, and the Middle East to obtain contracts.1 
Similarly, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer paid $2.3 billion, including 
a criminal fine of $1.195 billion, to settle civil and criminal 
investigations for promoting “off-label” uses of its drugs.2 From 
environmental damage to price fixing, large corporations can affect 
the lives of thousands—perhaps even millions—of people. 
The perception that corporations are persons like any other 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author may be 
contacted at peter.henning@wayne.edu.  
1 Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal 
Fines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter Siemens AG]. 
2 Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in 
its History, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
ma/Press Office – Press Release Files/Pfizer/Pfizer – PR (Final).pdf. 
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individual has been furthered by the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which 
stated, “The Court has thus rejected the argument that political 
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”3 Corporations are a part of 
the community and accorded a range of rights similar—although 
certainly not identical—to those enjoyed by individual members, 
and so it is natural that they are understood as being bound by the 
same laws and social norms as any other individual. 
Professors Sherman and Percy find that blaming a group for the 
acts of its members is a rational conclusion when the group has a 
high level of entativity, defined as “the perception that a group is a 
unified and coherent whole in which the members are tightly 
bound together.”4 They argue that “[i]f members are indeed 
perceived as interchangeable parts, the bad acts of any members 
will be seen as applying to all members. Thus, it is the group as a 
whole that is seen as blameworthy rather than (or at least in 
addition to) the specific individuals who behaved badly.”5 Finding 
an optimal punishment for an organization is a different question, 
however, because a group cannot be punished in the same way as 
an individual can, despite the desire to do so. 
The problems encountered in applying criminal sanctions to 
corporations reflect what some scholars argue is the 
inappropriateness of holding a corporation liable for a penal 
violation when it can only operate through its individual agents. 
Professor Albert W. Alschuler has argued that “corporate criminal 
punishment is a mistake,” and that it would be better to return to an 
eighteenth century understanding of the criminal law that limited 
its application to only individuals.6 Similarly, Professor John S. 
                                                          
3 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 766, at *900 
(U.S. Jan. 21, 2010). 
4 Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The Psychology of Collective 
Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities are Likely to be Held 
Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming Fall 2010). 
5 Id. 
6 Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways of Thinking About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2009). Professor Alschuler 
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Baker, Jr., has argued that “[m]odern corporations are abstract, 
impersonal, utilitarian entities lacking emotions and a personal 
story, and as such they do not deserve sympathy simply because 
they are not human. For that reason alone, they should not be the 
subjects of criminal prosecution.”7 Likewise, Professor John 
Hasnas has argued that a corporation is not the type of “thing” that 
can bear moral responsibility, so application of the criminal law to 
its operations is improper.8 
Some assert that the public perception of a corporation as a 
type of “person” to be treated the same as any individual is 
misguided. For example, Professor Alschuler has stated that when 
employees of a corporation engage in wrongdoing the public “may 
truly personify and hate the corporation,” but compares that to 
berating his computer for not responding or being the vehicle that 
delivers bad news.9 Professor Hasnas has argued that “the 
assignment of criminal responsibility to corporate entities is a 
direct violation of the theoretical structure of Anglo-American 
criminal law that has had extraordinarily pernicious effects in 
practice.”10 If corporations are only legal fictions, and do not exist 
                                                          
lamented, “Much to my regret, we cannot return to the eighteenth century.” Id. 
at 1372.  
7 John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal 
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 350 (2003). 
8  John Hasnas, Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?: 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J.L. 
& POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010). Professor Hasnas asserts that “attributing 
moral responsibility to corporations as collective entities is either without 
practical significance or ethically pernicious.” Id. Professor Smiley, on the other 
hand, takes the position that “collective moral responsibility is not defeated by 
the inability of groups to intend and to act. For, the ability to act and to intend is 
not a condition of moral responsibility per se.” Marion Smiley, From Moral 
Agency to Collective Wrongs: Re-thinking Collective Moral Responsibility, 19 
J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010). 
9 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1372–73. Professor Alschuler notes that 
“[e]xpressing one’s values by smashing a computer can be therapeutic, but it is 
not recommended for children or for grownups.” Id. at 1373. Of course, a 
computer is no more a corporation than the Washington Monument is the federal 
government, so equating criminal punishment with physically abusing an object 
seems to be a bit misdirected. 
10 John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2009). 
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apart from their assets and agents, then why should the 
organization be held liable under the criminal law rather than 
simply holding the agents responsible and, when necessary, 
extracting compensation through the seizure of assets? 
Perhaps the most cogent criticism of corporate criminal 
liability is that the only real punishment available against a 
corporation is a fine, which can be much more easily calibrated to 
redress any harm through a civil proceeding that does not require 
all the protections usually afforded in a criminal prosecution. 
When the only issue is monetary, the criminal courts are no better 
equipped to impose sanctions that will deter future misconduct and 
extract a measure of retribution than an administrative agency 
could through a civil suit or even an in-house adjudicative 
procedure.11 If civil proceedings are just as good as criminal 
prosecutions, then there seems to be a significant mismatch 
between the societal desire to punish corporations through the 
application of the criminal law, rather than just by way of civil 
sanctions, and the ability of the criminal law to be applied in a 
meaningful way.12 
                                                          
11 See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2009). 
If the application of the criminal law to conduct were based solely—or 
perhaps even predominantly—on whether it would deter future 
misconduct as a matter of both specific and general deterrence, then the 
argument against corporate criminal liability would be quite persuasive. 
The critique relies on the assumption that a system of civil enforcement 
that would result in the assessment of a monetary penalty could be 
created and would have roughly the same deterrent effect as a criminal 
prosecution and its resultant fine. Leaving aside the issue of regulatory 
capture in which regulated businesses take control of the agency 
charged with overseeing them, simply relying on civil enforcement 
mechanisms entails viewing the civil penalty as interchangeable with 
the criminal punishment, without regard to the underlying nature of the 
legal violation. In other words, it’s all just money to a corporation—so 
who cares what label is attached to it when you pay the same amount 
regardless of who collects it? 
Id. 
12 The amount of a criminal fine does not necessarily connote that a 
meaningful punishment has been imposed when taking into account the size of 
the organization and the impact of the payment on the organization. For 
example, Siemens paid a criminal fine of $450 million to settle the 
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If the only result of corporate criminal prosecutions were 
monetary penalties, then prosecuting corporations just so everyone 
feels better would debase the criminal law. Criminal sanctions are 
appropriate for a corporation, even if it has a compliance program 
in place, when the goal of the criminal prosecution is rehabilitation 
of the organization to change its corporate culture so that it can 
more effectively prevent future violations.13 While begrudging 
corporate criminal liability, Professor Alschuler noted that it does 
serve one purpose: “Because corporate criminal punishment is not 
really criminal punishment as people customarily understand it, 
harsh exemplary penalties are inappropriate. The goal should be to 
induce an appropriate level of monitoring within the 
organization.”14 Compliance programs in corporations are now 
commonplace, and no large organization can risk operating 
without a structure in place ostensibly designed to detect and 
prevent misconduct.  
Finding the proper balance in sanctioning a corporation can be 
frustrating because the typical tool for punishing a defendant, a 
term of incarceration, is not available, and the alternative of a fine 
is often perceived as simply a means by which a corporation buys 
its way out of a problem. Two recent cases involving corporate 
                                                          
government’s FCPA investigation, which seems like a significant amount, 
except that the company reported net income of 2.5 billion euros in 2009. U.S.  
supra note 1; Peter Löscher, Chief Executive Officer of Siemens AG, Letter to 
our Shareholders, SIEMENS, http://www.siemens.com/annual/09/en/letter_to_ 
our_shareholders/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
   Of course, a corporation does not have its “own” money in the same sense that 
an individual does because it is owned by its shareholders, so a fine does not 
come out of the company’s wallet but rather that of the shareholders. As 
Professor Kolber points out, “The act of handing over somebody else’s check is 
not severe at all. Fines are comparative in nature because only when fines are 
understood as a reduction in people’s assets (or a change in their level of 
happiness) can we make sense of their severity.” Adam J. Kolber, The 
Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1577 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
13 Henning, supra note 11, at 1431 (“When criminal prosecution and a 
resultant punishment is viewed as advancing the rehabilitation of the 
corporation, then the notion of reform rather than retrospective sanctions 
becomes the means to assess whether the criminal law should be used against 
the organization.”). 
14 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1389–90. 
88 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
misconduct show the frustration federal judges have in trying to 
impose appropriate sanctions on a corporation, and illustrate the 
need to use the criminal law as a tool for corporate reform and not 
merely as a means of exacting a form of meaningless retribution. 
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bank of America, a 
civil securities fraud case, United States District Court Judge Jed S. 
Rakoff rejected a proposed settlement because it contained only a 
token civil monetary penalty that would effectively penalize the 
very shareholders harmed by the misconduct.15 The case arose out 
of the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America during the 
2008 financial crisis. As part of the merger, Bank of America 
solicited votes from its shareholders to approve the transaction.16 
The proxy solicitation materials did not reveal the substantial 
financial problems that existed with Merrill Lynch’s assets, and 
stated that Merrill Lynch would not be permitted to pay bonuses to 
its executives when in fact Bank of America had already approved 
them.17 
The initial proposed settlement required Bank of America to 
pay a $33 million penalty and the court would issue an injunction 
                                                          
15 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of America Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 
507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Bank of America Corp.]. 
16 Id. 
17 The district court summarized the fraud claims as follows: 
(1) [T]he Proxy Statement that the Bank sent to its shareholders on 
November 3, 2008 soliciting their approval of the merger with Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill”) failed adequately to disclose the Bank’s 
agreement to let Merrill pay its executives and certain other employees 
$5.8 billion in bonuses at a time when Merrill was suffering huge 
losses; and  
(2) the Bank failed adequately to disclose to its shareholders either 
prior to the shareholder approval of the merger on December 5, 2008 or 
prior to the merger’s effective date of January 1, 2009 the Bank’s ever-
increasing knowledge that Merrill was suffering historically great 
losses during the fourth quarter of 2008 (ultimately amounting to a net 
loss of $15.3 billion, the largest quarterly loss in the firm’s history) and 
that Merrill had nonetheless accelerated the payment to certain 
executives and other employees of more than $3.6 billion in bonuses. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of America Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 
Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (line space 
in original) [hereinafter Sec. & Exch. Comm’n]. 
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barring it from future violations of the proxy fraud provisions.18 In 
rejecting the settlement, Judge Rakoff ridiculed the resolution as 
little more than window-dressing:  
The injunctive relief, as noted, is pointless. The fine, if 
looked at from the standpoint of the violation, is also 
inadequate, in that $33 million is a trivial penalty for a false 
statement that materially infected a multi-billion-dollar 
merger. But since the fine is imposed, not on the 
individuals putatively responsible, but on the shareholders, 
it is worse than pointless: it further victimizes the victims.19 
Even this civil effort to police corporate misconduct fell short 
because it simply glossed over the harm caused and did little to 
prevent future violations. More than just a meaningless conclusion, 
Judge Rakoff found that the settlement, which seemed to be an 
effort to hide the truth, made any purported punishment all the 
more suspect.20 He concluded: 
The proposed Consent Judgment in this case suggests a 
rather cynical relationship between the parties: the S.E.C. 
gets to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing on the part of 
the Bank of America in a high-profile merger; the Bank’s 
management gets to claim that they have been coerced into 
an onerous settlement by overzealous regulators. And all 
this is done at the expense, not only of the shareholders, but 
also of the truth.21 
When the Securities & Exchange Commission (“S.E.C.”) and 
Bank of America came back a few months later with a new 
settlement, they incorporated some modest measures to ensure that 
the corporation would not engage in similar misconduct in the 
future. Judge Rakoff found them to be an improvement—however 
modest—over the first settlement, explaining that “[n]o one can 
quarrel that these remedial steps are helpful, so far as they go, and 
may help to render less likely the kind of piecemeal and mincing 
approach to public disclosure that led to the Bank’s problems in 
                                                          
18 Bank of America Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
19 Id. at 512. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
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the instant cases.”22 Still, the outcome hardly met the judge’s view 
of an ideal result that should impose meaningful sanctions or lead 
Bank of America to implement real changes in its corporate 
governance to protect shareholders in the future. Judge Rakoff 
grudgingly approved the settlement, finding that it was “better than 
nothing” but still “half-baked justice at best.”23 
In United States v. Guidant LLC, United States District Judge 
Donovan W. Frank rejected a proposed plea agreement between 
Boston Scientific and federal prosecutors related to defective heart 
defibrillators manufactured and sold by Guidant Corporation.24 
After the violations at issue, Guidant Corporation was acquired by 
Boston Scientific, and is now a wholly-owned subsidiary.25 It pled 
guilty to making a false and misleading report to the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”), and for failing and refusing to 
report to the FDA a medical device correction.26 At issue were 
short-circuiting problems in some of Guidant’s defibrillators, 
which resulted in a number of deaths due to the device’s failure—
although the company was not charged with any crimes related to 
the loss of life.27 The plea agreement required Boston Scientific, as 
the controlling shareholder of Guidant, to pay a fine of 
                                                          
22 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2010 WL 624581, at *4. 
23 Id. at *5. The district court lamented: 
[T]he proposed settlement, while considerably improved over the 
vacuous proposal made last August in connection with the Undisclosed 
Bonuses case, is far from ideal. Its greatest virtue is that it is premised 
on a much better developed statement of the underlying facts and 
inferences drawn therefrom, which, while disputed by the Attorney 
General in another forum, have been carefully scrutinized by the Court 
here and found not to be irrational. Its greatest defect is that it 
advocates very modest punitive, compensatory, and remedial measures 
that are neither directed at the specific individuals responsible for the 
nondisclosures nor appear likely to have more than a very modest 
impact on corporate practices or victim compensation. While better 
than nothing, this is half-baked justice at best. 
Id.  
24 United States v. Guidant LLC, Crim. No. 10-mj-67 (DWF), 2010 WL 
1729179, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2010). 
25 See id. at *9. 
26 See id. at *10. 
27 See id. at *6. 
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$253,962,251 and also forfeit $42,079,675.28 
While Judge Frank did not disagree with the financial 
provisions of the plea agreement, he found that the government’s 
failure to include a term of probation that would require future 
reforms by Boston Scientific meant that it was “not in the best 
interests of justice and d[id] not serve the public’s interest because 
they d[id] not adequately address Guidant’s history and the 
criminal conduct at issue.”29 The government and the company 
defended the decision not to include any form of corporate 
probation because “Boston Scientific is a conglomerate” and 
Guidant was no longer an operating part of the company, so that 
imposing probationary terms “[wa]s absolutely meaningless.”30 
Moreover, the parent company was already under supervision from 
an unrelated civil settlement, so that a means for supervising the 
entire corporation was already in place.31 
Guidant involved the problem of pursuing the criminal 
prosecution of a corporation, for a wrongdoing that occurred years 
earlier, when the entity no longer existed because it had been 
acquired by another company that was not directly responsible for 
the violation. Corporations cease to exist with great regularity, 
particularly when there is a boom in mergers and acquisitions that 
creates conglomerates comprised of a number of different 
operating divisions, which happened in the healthcare field a few 
years ago. 
Judge Frank was unwilling to simply abide by corporate 
formalities to excuse the entity in its current form from having to 
take any concrete steps to reform itself, finding that “[t]he interests 
of justice are not served by allowing a company to avoid probation 
[by] simply changing their corporate form.”32 The district court 
concluded that “a term of probation would be appropriate in this 
case and could be fashioned in a manner to serve the public’s 
interest and address the accountability issues” raised by two 
                                                          
28 Id. at *3. 
29 Id. at *9. 
30 Id. These were the statements of one of the federal prosecutors in the 
case. 
31 Id. at *10. 
32 Id. at *11. 
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doctors whose patient died when a Guidant defibrillator short 
circuited.33   
The judge noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines call for 
probation if “necessary to ensure that changes are made within the 
organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”34 
Among the potential terms of a corporate probation that could be 
considered is community service “to repair the harm caused by” 
Guidant’s offenses and to “help build the public’s confidence in 
the FDA regulation process, the medical device manufacturers’ 
quality control efforts, and the cardiac healthcare industry in 
general.”35 In addition, corporate probation could include 
dedicating additional resources to corporate charitable programs 
and to Boston Scientific’s internal compliance and ethics 
programs.36   
While none of these available probationary requirements would 
necessarily prevent future misconduct, the district court in Guidant 
was deeply concerned about the absence of any remedial 
provisions in the sentencing, which it viewed as crucial to 
accepting the plea bargain.37 Paying out money, whether styled as 
restitution or a fine, addressed only the past but not the future. 
Judge Frank perceived that corporate punishment imposed without 
including terms designed to help the organization change the way 
it does business was a meaningless application of the criminal law. 
The decisions in Bank of America and Guidant show that 
perceptions of corporate crime are not just limited to an assessment 
of corporate guilt, but include an understanding of the efficacy of 
corporate punishment that is different from prosecutions of an 
individual. While an organization may have various human 
characteristics attributed to it, a corporation is also understood as 
something that should be treated differently in the application of 
sanctions. The district judges in Bank of America and Guidant 
looked at these corporations in a similar way the general public 
does, that organizations are certainly capable of engaging in 
                                                          
33 Id. at *12. 
34 Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 8D1.1(6) (2010)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at *15. 
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wrongdoing apart from what any individual might have 
accomplished, and that just imposing fines without seeking to 
reform the corporation provides little real benefit to society.  
The perception of corporate punishment does matter when the 
public views the company as a coherent entity that can be changed 
by the application of criminal sanctions so that it can conform to 
the requirements of the law. As such, society wants to see 
something more than a corporation paying a fine because that 
merely represents its ability to buy its way out of a criminal case. 
Rather, it wants to see criminal punishment used to rehabilitate a 
corporation to prevent future misconduct.   
Civil sanctions are understood as a means of resolving a case 
without assigning blame, while criminal prosecution brings with it 
the demand that an organization take responsibility for its conduct, 
which reflects more than just the actions of individual agents. 
Demanding concrete changes in how an organization conducts 
itself is a reasonable means of responding to the psychological 
perception that corporations can be blameworthy. Using the 
criminal law as a means to rehabilitate the organization is not a 
misuse of penal sanctions, but a rational response to society’s 
desire to see those responsible for misconduct punished. 
 
 
